The Last Picture Show? Spielberg, The Fabelmans, and the Schlemiel

When it first came out, I went with my parents to the legendary Delaware Theater (formerly the Spectrum) in Albany, New York, to see Steven Spielberg’s newest film, The Fabelmans, which takes Spielberg himself—the genealogical story of his love of film and his family—as its subject.

What struck me first, even before seeing the film, was the place where I was seeing it and the audience with whom I was seeing it.

Because of the streaming revolution—Netflix, Hulu, Prime, and everything that has followed—fewer people go to movie theaters anymore. Of the few people who were sitting in this classic theater, which opened in 1941 and still bears traces of another cinematic America, nearly all were my parents’ age. Most of them, like Spielberg, were baby boomers.

Sitting there with my parents made me pause.

I realized that I was about to watch Steven Spielberg look back at his childhood while sitting beside the generation that had given Spielberg—and the movies—to me.

Like millions of Americans of my generation, I was raised on movies made by my parents’ generation. I was inspired by them and, in many ways, have lived my life in the light they cast across the shadowy film caves of my youth. Spielberg made some of our favorite films: Jaws, Close Encounters of the Third Kind, Raiders of the Lost Ark, E.T., and so many others. Even films he produced rather than directed—Back to the Future, for instance—belonged to the Spielbergian universe in which many of us grew up.

We entered those dark rooms and came out seeing the world differently.

But now the theater was nearly empty.

And Spielberg, the great maker of dreams, was no longer showing us dinosaurs, aliens, sharks, archaeologists, soldiers, or spaceships.

He was showing us his mother and father.

He was showing us himself.

And, perhaps most importantly, he was showing us the little Jewish boy who learned how to hide behind the camera.

The Man Behind the Blockbuster

This is what makes The Fabelmans such a strange film in Spielberg’s career.

For decades, Spielberg gave America images that seemed larger than life. His movies were exercises in wonder. Something suddenly appeared that shattered the limits of the ordinary world: a shark beneath the water, a spaceship in the sky, an extraterrestrial hiding in a suburban house, an archaeological object charged with divine power.

Spielberg was the magician.

The Fabelmans asks us to look behind the magician’s curtain.

And what do we find there?

Not Indiana Jones.

Not the heroic American filmmaker.

We find Sammy Fabelman: an awkward Jewish boy with a camera.

In other words, we find something remarkably close to the schlemiel.

Sammy does not dominate the world. He watches it. He is frequently confused by it. His family embarrasses him. His mother overwhelms him. His father does not entirely understand him. His classmates humiliate him. His Jewishness marks him as different. He wants desperately to belong to America, and yet he repeatedly finds himself standing slightly outside of it.

But this distance becomes his gift.

He watches.

And then he turns what he sees into images.

The Schlemiel Sees What Everyone Else Misses

The schlemiel has always occupied an unusual relationship to reality.

Everyone else seems to understand the rules of the world. The schlemiel arrives late, misunderstands the situation, says the wrong thing, trips over something, or takes literally what everyone else understands figuratively.

We laugh because the schlemiel doesn’t quite understand reality.

But the deeper comic possibility is precisely the opposite.

Perhaps reality does not understand the schlemiel.

Because he does not completely fit into the social order, the schlemiel sometimes sees something that those who are successfully integrated into it cannot see.

That is Sammy Fabelman’s situation.

His camera initially seems like an escape from reality. He recreates train crashes. He stages Westerns. He turns Boy Scouts into actors and the ordinary American landscape into Hollywood.

But Spielberg gradually reverses this relationship.

The camera is not simply a means of escaping reality.

It becomes a way of discovering it.

The decisive moment comes when Sammy edits the footage from the family camping trip and discovers something nobody else has noticed: his mother is in love with Bennie, his father’s best friend.

The camera knows before the family knows.

Or rather, the boy behind the camera sees what the adults cannot—or will not—see.

The filmmaker is therefore caught in a terrible position. The images that create wonder can also destroy illusions.

Film reveals.

The Jewish Family and the Birth of an Artist

This is also why Spielberg’s Jewishness matters so much in The Fabelmans.

Spielberg has made explicitly Jewish films before, most obviously Schindler’s List. But The Fabelmans approaches Jewishness differently. Jewishness is not primarily historical catastrophe here. It is family. It is embarrassment. It is difference. It is the mother. It is relatives talking over one another. It is being called names at school. It is the strange feeling of being Jewish while simultaneously wanting to participate completely in the American dream.

Sammy wants America.

And America beats him up.

Then Sammy films America.

And something extraordinary happens.

The antisemitic athlete who torments him at school becomes, through Sammy’s camera, a Greek god.

This is one of the strangest and most important moments in the film.

Why would Sammy make his tormentor beautiful?

The bully himself cannot understand it.

Neither, perhaps, can Sammy.

And this inability to explain himself is crucial.

Sammy possesses power but does not use it in the obvious way. He could humiliate his enemy. Instead, he transforms him.

This is not revenge.

It is something much stranger.

It may even be the ethical secret of Spielberg’s cinema.

The Schlemiel’s Revenge

The schlemiel’s revenge has rarely been revenge.

Sholem Aleichem’s characters do not conquer their enemies. Chaplin’s Tramp does not seize political power. The little man survives the powerful by transforming the world through gesture, fantasy, language, laughter, and imagination.

Sammy does something similar with film.

He cannot defeat the beautiful, athletic, antisemitic American boy on the boy’s own terms. But behind the camera, the hierarchy suddenly changes.

The outsider becomes the creator of the image.

The powerful person becomes his subject.

And yet Spielberg complicates this fantasy of artistic power because Sammy does not simply make his enemy ridiculous. He makes him magnificent.

This is the generosity—and perhaps the foolishness—of the schlemiel.

The schlemiel cannot stop imagining that the world might be better than it is.

Spielberg’s cinema has always been accused of sentimentality for precisely this reason. His movies repeatedly return to wonder, reconciliation, childhood, family, homecoming, and the possibility that the damaged world can somehow be repaired.

The sophisticated person knows better.

The cynic certainly knows better.

But perhaps Spielberg doesn’t.

Or perhaps he knows perfectly well and chooses wonder anyway.

“You Do What Your Heart Says You Have To”

One of the film’s most important characters appears almost like a messenger from another world: Sammy’s great-uncle Boris, played by Judd Hirsch.

He understands something Sammy’s parents do not.

Art will tear him apart.

Family pulls in one direction. Art pulls in another.

The artist loves people, but he also turns them into images.

This is the frightening discovery at the center of The Fabelmans. The camera gives Sammy the ability to preserve the people he loves, but it also puts distance between himself and them.

To film something is already, in some sense, to stand outside it.

Sammy therefore occupies the classical position of the schlemiel: inside and outside at once.

He belongs to his family and watches his family.

He belongs to America and watches America.

He wants the beautiful American girl and cannot quite believe she wants him.

He suffers antisemitism and then turns the antisemite into a movie star.

He participates in life and simultaneously converts life into representation.

This doubleness may be one of the deepest sources of Spielberg’s cinema.

The Movie Theater as a Cave of Memory

And this brings me back to that nearly empty theater in Albany.

There was something uncanny about watching this particular film there.

An old movie theater.

My parents.

An audience largely made up of people from Spielberg’s generation.

And on the screen, an aging Spielberg reconstructing the moment when a frightened Jewish child first discovered the power of cinema.

For most of Spielberg’s career, we looked forward with him.

What will emerge from the water?

What will descend from the sky?

What lies behind the next door?

What forgotten world will the camera reveal?

But The Fabelmans reverses the camera.

Spielberg looks backward.

And suddenly the great cinematic cave in which generations of Americans dreamed together begins to look historical.

People no longer need to gather in darkness to see moving images. The images follow us everywhere now. They are on our televisions, laptops, tablets, and phones. They arrive endlessly, privately, algorithmically.

Something has been gained.

But something may also have disappeared.

The movie theater made strangers dream together.

What Our Parents Projected

Perhaps this is why watching The Fabelmans with my parents affected me so deeply.

I realized that Spielberg’s generation had projected more than movies onto those enormous screens.

They projected a world.

And we inherited it.

We inherited their sharks and spaceships, their archaeologists and aliens, their fears and fantasies, their suburban homes, broken families, miraculous children, monsters, adventures, and dreams of reconciliation.

They taught us how to look.

But The Fabelmans asks a more difficult question: Who taught them how to look?

Spielberg’s answer takes us backward—from the blockbuster to the filmmaker, from the filmmaker to the boy, from the boy to the family, and from the family to a Jewish-American story of migration, assimilation, difference, longing, embarrassment, and imagination.

Behind Steven Spielberg stands Sammy Fabelman.

And behind Sammy stands his mother, dancing in headlights.

His father, believing in machines and reason.

His sisters.

His eccentric relatives.

The Jewish family.

America.

And a little boy holding a camera between himself and all of them.

The Fable-Man

Even the fictional name Spielberg gives himself is worth considering.

Fabelman.

The fable-man.

The man who makes fables.

There is something wonderfully schlemiel-like about the name because the schlemiel has always survived through stories. He does not possess the world. He narrates it.

Tevye cannot control his daughters, history, modernity, Russia, poverty, or God.

But he can tell us about them.

And through the telling, something survives.

Sammy Fabelman cannot keep his parents together. He cannot prevent desire. He cannot eliminate antisemitism. He cannot control America. He cannot even fully understand why he needs to make movies.

But he can make a fable from what happens.

That may be Spielberg’s deepest autobiographical confession.

Cinema did not give him control over life.

It gave him a way of responding to life’s uncontrollability.

That distinction matters.

The Schlemiel Behind the Camera

At the end of the film, Sammy encounters John Ford.

Ford gives the aspiring filmmaker one brutally simple lesson about the horizon: if the horizon is at the bottom of the frame, it’s interesting; if it’s at the top, it’s interesting; if it’s in the middle, it’s boring.

Sammy leaves.

And then Spielberg gives us one final joke.

The camera itself suddenly tilts.

The horizon moves.

It is an extraordinary little gesture because, after a film about divorce, antisemitism, desire, loneliness, generational conflict, and the painful birth of an artist, Spielberg ends with a gag.

The world is crooked.

So adjust the camera.

Perhaps that is the schlemiel’s philosophy in miniature.

The schlemiel cannot straighten the world.

He cannot undo the past.

He cannot keep his parents together.

He cannot prevent history from happening.

But he can change the angle from which we see it.

And sometimes that tiny adjustment is enough to transform suffering into a story, humiliation into comedy, memory into art.

Sitting beside my parents in that old Albany theater, watching an aging Spielberg look back toward his parents, I felt for a moment as though several generations were looking at one another across the darkness.

Our parents gave us these images.

We lived inside them.

And now, as the theaters empty and the generation that created this cinematic world grows older, Spielberg has finally turned the camera around.

Behind the spectacle we discover the family.

Behind the filmmaker, the Jewish child.

Behind the hero, the outsider.

And behind one of the most powerful image-makers in the history of American cinema, perhaps, there was always a schlemiel holding a camera, trying to figure out what in the world he was looking at.

“It’s Funny,” No, it’s not: On Shalom Auslander’s Anxious Post-Holocaust Cynicism, or Sit-Down Comedy

“It’s Funny”: Shalom Auslander, Diogenes, and the Cynical Schlemiel After the Holocaust

Teaching Shalom Auslander’s Hope: A Tragedy for a course on the Holocaust was a fascinating educational exercise because I used the novel to prompt my students—and myself—into a dialogue with what I would call anxious American Jewish post-Holocaust cynicism.

It is a strange dialogue because Auslander doesn’t exactly want to have one.

Or, better: Solomon Kugel, the novel’s main character, seems incapable of having one without turning it into a joke.

This is one of the things I ask my students to watch for as they read the novel: its constant post-Holocaust counter-intuitions. Whenever we expect solemnity, Kugel gives us obscenity. Whenever we expect memory, he gives us anxiety. Whenever we expect Jewish continuity, he gives us neurosis. Whenever we expect Anne Frank to signify innocence, tragedy, and the obligation to remember, Auslander puts her in an attic and transforms her into an irritable old woman who refuses to die.

And whenever we think we know what suffering means, Kugel makes a joke.

This is why the opening words of the novel are so important:

“It’s funny:”

Everything begins there.

Before the Holocaust, before Anne Frank, before Jewish memory, before theology, before Kugel’s mother and her bizarre obsession with suffering, before Kugel’s obsession with his own death—there is the declaration that something is funny.

But what could possibly be funny here?

And what kind of Jewish philosophical statement begins with the words “It’s funny”?

The Post-Holocaust Stand-Up Philosopher

The narrator of Hope: A Tragedy frequently sounds less like a novelist than like a cynical American Jewish stand-up comedian. He seems to be perpetually fighting with his own community, telling dirty jokes about Jewish suffering, American Jewish identity, Holocaust memory, family, death, guilt, and the strange condition of being an American Jew several generations after Auschwitz.

The comedy is aggressive because the anxiety is aggressive.

And, as with many Jewish comic protagonists, much of Kugel’s suffering begins with his mother.

She suffers.

She remembers suffering.

She invents suffering.

She seems almost disappointed by the fact that she has not suffered enough.

Kugel inherits this relationship to suffering, but transforms it into another form: an obsessive anticipation of his own death. He wants to know what his last words will be. He thinks about how he will die. He imagines disaster everywhere.

It is as if history has migrated inward.

The catastrophe that happened to European Jewry becomes, generations later, a catastrophe endlessly anticipated by the American Jewish psyche.

And then Kugel discovers Anne Frank living in his attic.

At this point, Auslander makes his most outrageous comic move. He takes perhaps the most sacred secular icon of Holocaust memory and refuses to leave her within the realm of tragedy.

Anne Frank has survived.

But survival itself turns out to be a problem.

This is where Hope: A Tragedy becomes philosophically interesting. Because Auslander is not simply making jokes about the Holocaust. He is asking—obscenely, aggressively, perhaps even cruelly—what happens when the moral language surrounding catastrophe becomes incapable of containing the lives of the generations that come afterward.

And this is precisely where I find myself thinking about Diogenes.

Diogenes: The Mad Socrates

Diogenes, the ancient father of Cynicism, was famously described by Plato as a “Socrates gone mad.”

The phrase is wonderful because it suggests that the Cynic is not simply the opposite of the philosopher. He is philosophy pushed beyond the boundaries of philosophical respectability.

In Critique of Cynical Reason, Peter Sloterdijk develops this idea through what he calls ancient kynicism. Kynicism is not simply pessimism or disbelief. It is bodily, vulgar, comic resistance to the elevated languages through which philosophy and political authority present themselves.

It is, above all, cheeky.

Sloterdijk associates this cheekiness with the German frech: boldness, impudence, productive aggressivity.

Diogenes does not refute philosophy by constructing another philosophical system.

He refutes philosophy with his body.

When Socrates speaks about the divine soul, the kynic picks his nose.

When Socrates speaks about the Ideas, the kynic farts.

When philosophers elevate Eros into metaphysics, the kynic masturbates in public.

The response is outrageous because it refuses the terms of philosophical discourse altogether.

Socrates can defeat the Sophist because the Sophist agrees to enter into conversation with him. And conversation already assumes something: that truth will emerge through argument, distinction, questioning, and reason.

Diogenes refuses the contract.

He doesn’t answer Socrates with a better argument.

He farts.

When the Clown Refuses the Conversation

This is much more significant than it initially appears.

For Sloterdijk, philosophical conversation itself presupposes what he calls an “idealist agreement.” Socrates is unbeatable so long as his opponent agrees that the question will ultimately be decided by discourse.

But what happens when someone refuses discourse?

What happens when someone answers metaphysics with obscenity?

Or tragedy with a joke?

The kynic discovers something that will later become central to the clown, the fool—and, I would argue, the schlemiel.

Sometimes the body can say what discourse cannot.

This is why Sloterdijk describes Diogenes through a constellation of wonderfully suggestive phrases: “satirical resistance,” “uncivil enlightenment,” “material embodiment,” “low theory,” and the “language of the clown.”

The clown doesn’t produce another theory.

The clown performs a counter-theory.

And this is also why the famous encounter between Diogenes and Alexander the Great matters so much.

According to the anecdote, Alexander supposedly declared that if he were not Alexander, he would want to be Diogenes.

Sloterdijk sees something profound in this statement. Alexander possesses armies, political power, historical ambition, and imperial authority. Diogenes possesses almost nothing.

And yet Alexander recognizes something in Diogenes that he himself cannot possess.

Freedom from Alexander.

The ruler confronts the fool and discovers that the fool inhabits a place beyond the ruler’s authority.

As Sloterdijk puts it, those who rule can lose their self-confidence before “fools, clowns, and kynics.”

The clown becomes dangerous precisely because he refuses to take power’s language seriously.

From the Kynic to the Schlemiel

But here I want to make a distinction.

Solomon Kugel is not Diogenes.

And the schlemiel is not simply a Jewish kynic.

Diogenes is shameless. Kugel is filled with shame.

Diogenes seems radically at home in his body. Kugel is terrified of his body dying.

Diogenes frees himself from society’s expectations. Kugel cannot stop hearing the voices of his mother, his therapist, Jewish history, Holocaust memory, and his own anxious conscience.

Diogenes chooses homelessness.

Kugel buys a house.

And then discovers Anne Frank living in it.

This difference matters.

The schlemiel does not stand outside history and laugh at it. History has already entered the schlemiel.

His comedy therefore has a different texture.

Diogenes can laugh because Alexander cannot control him.

Kugel laughs because he cannot control anything.

His family.

His house.

His mother.

His future.

His death.

His Jewishness.

And certainly not the Holocaust.

The classical Cynic confronts power through shamelessness.

The post-Holocaust schlemiel confronts history through anxiety.

This may be why Auslander’s comedy feels simultaneously liberating and suffocating. The joke attacks the sacred language surrounding Jewish suffering, but the comedian cannot escape the suffering he attacks.

He is trapped inside his own punchline.

Anne Frank in the Attic

And this brings us back to Auslander’s most outrageous invention.

Anne Frank is alive.

She is living in Kugel’s attic.

What does one do with this?

The obvious answer is that Auslander is desecrating an icon of Holocaust memory. And he certainly wants us to feel the force of that desecration.

But perhaps something more interesting is happening.

Anne Frank has become so thoroughly absorbed into the moral vocabulary of postwar Western culture that she risks becoming an abstraction: innocence, hope, victimhood, humanity.

Auslander violently returns her to the body.

She eats.

She smells.

She complains.

She takes up space.

She becomes inconvenient.

In other words, she stops functioning exclusively as a symbol.

This is an extraordinarily kynical gesture.

The sacred abstraction is dragged downstairs into material existence.

But Auslander adds a specifically Jewish-American complication: Kugel cannot simply dismiss her.

That would be too easy.

He feels obligated to her.

He feels guilty about her.

He resents her.

He fears her.

He wants to get rid of her.

He cannot get rid of her.

And perhaps this is the central comic situation of Hope: A Tragedy.

Kugel literally cannot get the Holocaust out of his house.

“It’s Funny”

This is why I keep returning with my students to those opening words:

“It’s funny:”

Perhaps Auslander is announcing the philosophical method of the entire novel.

Something happened to Jewish comedy after the Holocaust.

The schlemiel who once stumbled through the shtetl now wanders through American suburbia carrying historical catastrophe inside his head.

And the old philosophical opposition between tragedy and comedy becomes unstable.

Is Auschwitz tragic?

Of course.

Can its memory become neurotic?

Can remembrance become suffocating?

Can inherited suffering become absurd?

Can Jewish memory become an ideology?

Can the comedian mock that ideology without mocking the dead?

And what happens when the Jew who asks these questions discovers that the dead are not quite dead?

Auslander refuses to answer these questions philosophically.

Like Diogenes, he gives us something lower.

Dirtier.

More embarrassing.

A mother obsessed with suffering.

A neurotic Jew obsessed with death.

An elderly Anne Frank hiding in an attic.

And a narrator who keeps making jokes.

But there is an important difference between Diogenes and Auslander.

Diogenes uses comedy to free himself from illusion.

Auslander is not so sure freedom is possible.

That may be what makes Solomon Kugel a distinctly post-Holocaust schlemiel.

The kynic laughs and walks away.

The schlemiel laughs—and remains.

He remains with his mother.

He remains with Anne Frank.

He remains with Jewish history.

He remains with his anxiety.

And he remains with the impossible question of what one is supposed to do with suffering that happened before one was born but somehow continues to occupy the attic.

Perhaps that is why the novel does not begin with “Once upon a time.”

It begins with something far more dangerous:

“It’s funny.”

The Last Yiddish Schlemiel: Cynthia Ozick’s “Envy; or, Yiddish in America”

What happens to the schlemiel when the world that created him disappears?

Cynthia Ozick’s “Envy; or, Yiddish in America” poses this question with extraordinary comic cruelty. Its central character, Edelshtein, is an aging Yiddish poet living in America, surrounded by a language that increasingly cannot hear him. He writes. He complains. He envies. He dreams of recognition. But almost no one reads him.

His great rival, Ostrover, has escaped this fate. Ostrover has been translated into English and has become famous. He has crossed over.

Edelshtein has not.

And therein lies the joke—and the wound.

A Writer Without Readers

The tragedy of Edelshtein is not simply that he is unsuccessful. Writers have always been jealous of successful writers. Ozick is interested in something much more disturbing.

Edelshtein belongs to a language whose readership is disappearing.

This changes the meaning of literary failure. If a poet writes a great poem and nobody appreciates it, he can blame his readers. But what if the readers themselves are disappearing? What if the language in which one has formed one’s deepest thoughts, memories, jokes, rhythms, and desires is becoming inaccessible to the next generation?

Edelshtein does not simply fear that he will be forgotten.

He fears that the world capable of remembering him is disappearing.

This is why translation becomes almost messianic in the story. Edelshtein wants to be translated into English because English promises resurrection. Translation might carry him across the boundary separating the Yiddish past from the American future.

But there is a terrible paradox here.

To survive as a Yiddish writer, Edelshtein must cease to be read in Yiddish.

The Comedy of Envy

Ozick refuses to turn Edelshtein into a noble martyr.

This is crucial.

He is jealous, vain, bitter, obsessive, self-important, and frequently ridiculous. He cannot stop measuring himself against Ostrover. Ostrover’s success becomes an insult that Edelshtein experiences almost metaphysically.

Why him?

Why not me?

Why should he become the representative of Yiddish literature to America?

This is where Ozick’s story becomes a story about the schlemiel.

The schlemiel traditionally inhabits the distance between what he imagines himself to be and what the world allows him to become. He wants dignity and encounters humiliation. He wants recognition and encounters indifference. He attempts to act upon history and discovers that history is acting upon him.

Edelshtein inhabits precisely this gap.

But Ozick gives the schlemiel’s comedy a historical dimension.

Edelshtein is not merely unlucky.

History itself has made him ridiculous.

When History Outruns the Schlemiel

This is one of the deepest problems raised by modern Jewish comedy.

The traditional schlemiel can stumble through the world because, somewhere behind him, there remains a community capable of understanding the joke. His failures take place within a shared language, tradition, and cultural memory.

But what happens when that community disappears?

After the Holocaust and the massive assimilation of American Jews into English-speaking American culture, Yiddish entered a radically different historical situation. The schlemiel could survive—but increasingly in translation.

Tevye could become Fiddler on the Roof.

Yiddish stories could become Jewish-American literature.

And eventually the schlemiel could appear in American fiction, television, stand-up comedy, and film without speaking a word of Yiddish.

Something survives.

But something has also been lost.

Edelshtein stands precisely at this threshold.

He is a schlemiel who knows that the joke may continue after him—but perhaps in another language.

Translation as Resurrection

This is why Edelshtein’s obsession with translation should not be dismissed as simple vanity.

He understands something.

Translation is power.

Ostrover has not merely acquired readers. He has acquired an afterlife.

English allows him to enter another cultural world. He can circulate among people who have never lived within Yiddish culture. His work can become “literature” rather than merely “Yiddish literature.”

Edelshtein wants the same transformation.

But translation presents an impossible question:

What exactly survives when a Jewish story leaves the language that created it?

The plot may survive.

The character may survive.

The joke may survive.

But does the world survive?

Yiddish is not simply a collection of words that can be exchanged for English words. It carries gestures, ironies, biblical echoes, rabbinic rhythms, curses, diminutives, exaggerations, historical memories, and forms of intimacy.

The schlemiel emerges from this linguistic world.

Translate him into English and something extraordinary happens.

He becomes universal.

But perhaps he becomes universal precisely by becoming less particular.

From Sholem Aleichem to America

This problem becomes especially interesting when Ozick is placed alongside Sholem Aleichem.

Sholem Aleichem’s characters inhabit a Jewish world even when that world is collapsing around them. Tevye argues with God through biblical quotations. His misunderstandings are funny precisely because his language is saturated with tradition.

The schlemiel does not stand outside Judaism.

He trips over its words.

By the time we reach Ozick’s America, however, the problem has changed.

The question is no longer simply how the Jew survives modernity.

It is how Jewish language survives the Jew’s successful entry into modernity.

America offers extraordinary possibilities. Jews can enter universities, professions, publishing, entertainment, politics, and the arts.

But cultural success creates its own paradox.

The Jew enters America.

English enters the Jew.

And Yiddish slowly becomes memory.

Edelshtein therefore represents a strange historical figure: the schlemiel produced not by exclusion from modernity but by Jewish integration into it.

The Schlemiel After Yiddish

This helps explain why the American schlemiel becomes so important.

The figure does not disappear when Yiddish disappears from everyday Jewish life.

He migrates.

One can trace something of this migration from Sholem Aleichem through American Jewish literature and eventually into American comedy.

Woody Allen does not need to speak Yiddish to inherit something from the schlemiel.

Neither does Larry David.

Nor do the countless anxious, socially maladroit, overly intellectual, self-defeating Jewish characters who populate American comedy.

But Ozick forces us to ask what happened during this migration.

What was gained?

What was lost?

Perhaps Edelshtein stands at the border crossing.

Behind him lies the Yiddish world.

Ahead of him lies American Jewish comedy.

And Edelshtein cannot quite cross.

That is why he is funny.

That is why he is unbearable.

And that is why he is tragic.

The Schlemiel as a Witness

There is another possibility.

Perhaps Edelshtein’s failure is itself a form of testimony.

The schlemiel has always possessed a peculiar relationship to history. He rarely conquers history. He doesn’t resemble the epic hero who imposes himself upon the world through strength, courage, or political power.

The schlemiel persists.

He remains after humiliation.

He continues speaking when speaking seems pointless.

And this may be Edelshtein’s deepest significance.

He keeps writing Yiddish poetry in a world that increasingly has no use for Yiddish poetry.

From one perspective, this is absurd.

From another, it is an extraordinary refusal.

The world tells him that his language has become obsolete.

He answers by speaking it again.

And again.

And again.

His failure therefore contains a strange dignity.

Not the dignity of the hero who defeats history, but the dignity of the person who refuses to allow history to have the final word.

Who Gets the Last Laugh?

Ozick leaves us with an uncomfortable question.

Who is the real schlemiel?

Is it Edelshtein, stubbornly writing for readers who no longer exist?

Or is it the American Jewish world that believes it can abandon the language of its ancestors without losing anything essential?

Perhaps the joke turns back upon us.

We laugh at Edelshtein because he cannot accept reality.

But Edelshtein may understand something that everyone around him has forgotten.

A language is not merely a tool.

It is a world.

And when a language disappears, a particular way of laughing, suffering, remembering, arguing, and speaking to the dead disappears with it.

The schlemiel survives.

He crosses into English.

He becomes American.

He becomes famous.

But Ozick’s “Envy; or, Yiddish in America” asks us to look back for a moment at the figure who did not make the crossing.

Edelshtein remains standing on the other side, still talking.

Perhaps nobody is listening.

But he keeps talking anyway.

And what could be more schlemiel-like than that?

Ai and the Schlemiel

The Three Stooges, trying to fix malfunctioning technologies.

One of the greatest scenes in American film history is Charlie Chaplin’s film, Modern Times (1936).

Charlie Chaplin’s “Modern Times” (1936) is a satirical comedy that critiques the dehumanizing effects of industrialization. Chaplin’s iconic Tramp character struggles to survive in a mechanized world, facing assembly-line monotony, unemployment, and the economic hardship of the Great Depression.

The film masterfully blends slapstick humor with social commentary, highlighting the tension between humanity and the relentless pace of modern progress.

The Schlemiel figure, classically marked by his clumsy vulnerability, is reflected in Chaplin’s Tramp. In “Modern Times,” the Tramp’s struggle against the mechanized factory is a quintessential Schlemiel narrative: he’s overwhelmed by forces beyond his control—conveyor belts, gears, and rigid systems.

His humanity—like the Schlemiel’s—is preserved through humor and resilience, but he remains out of sync with the relentless logic of the machine, embodying a profound commentary on modern alienation.

In a Three Stooges scenario, machinery is often a direct source of chaos, with the Stooges creating slapstick mayhem as they bumble through mechanical tasks. The difference, however, is that the Stooges’ humor is more anarchic—machines become props for physical comedy. In “Modern Times,” Chaplin’s Schlemiel isn’t just clumsy; he’s a poignant reflection of the human being dwarfed by industrial systems. The Stooges lampoon incompetence; Chaplin’s Tramp critiques the system itself.


Phenomenologically, these interactions with machines reveal a tension between embodied human intentionality and the rigid, indifferent structures of technology.

Chaplin’s Tramp and the Stooges both embody a human presence that doesn’t naturally sync with mechanical rhythms. The machine operates on fixed logic, while the human—finite, improvisational—finds friction there. The slapstick “errors” are, in a deeper sense, a manifestation of human intentionality colliding with a world of objects that do not reciprocate. The result is a kind of existential misfitting—where the Schlemiel (or Stooge) reveals the gap between human agency and the mechanized world.

Phenomenologically, when we witness these absurd human-machine interactions, we’re invited to reflect on the nature of freedom and constraint.

The machine represents a predetermined, rigid structure—a system that imposes order. The Stooge or Schlemiel, by failing within that system, reveals the contingency and non-necessity of these structures. While the characters seem trapped, the audience experiences a kind of liberation through laughter.

In other words, these comedic breakdowns highlight that technological systems are not absolute—they are contingent constructs. Thus, there’s a subtle agency in human error. By watching these characters fail, we’re reminded that we are not just cogs; there’s room to resist, redefine, or subvert the systems we encounter.

The humor is a phenomenological rupture that opens a space for reflection on freedom itself.

Ai and the Schlemiel

When we think of AI, the Schlemiel’s relationship is once again that of a human caught in a system of logic beyond their full comprehension. AI is precise, predictive, and dispassionately efficient. The Schlemiel, stumbling in interactions with AI, reveals that human life isn’t reducible to data.

Just as Chaplin’s Tramp is out of sync with industrial machines, today’s Schlemiel might find themselves bewildered by algorithmic decisions. But here, too, is a margin of freedom: the Schlemiel’s failures are reminders of human unpredictability, creativity, and ethical judgment—things AI cannot fully replicate.

By showing where we fail or resist AI’s logic, the Schlemiel highlights our capacity to redefine the rules, reminding us that even in a world of AI, human meaning—and freedom—emerges in the gaps.

Freedom emerges in the gaps, it’s in the moments where AI logic fails to account for human nuance that our agency appears. AI optimizes for patterns; the Schlemiel, by contrast, stumbles or defies pattern expectations.

In that gap—where the human does something unexpected, irrational, or imaginative—we assert what is uniquely ours.

These gaps are where human values, ethical choices, or creative impulses arise, often outside what AI anticipates. Thus, the Schlemiel’s “failure” signals that not everything about human existence is programmable or predictable. The gap is where we invent meaning.

Unpredictability in the Schlemiel is integral because the Schlemiel disrupts the expected order—both social and logical. In comedy, we anticipate patterns, but the Schlemiel’s missteps subvert them. Phenomenologically, this unmoors us from the ordinary flow of meaning, exposing the world’s openness. The Schlemiel’s unpredictable blunders reveal that the rigid systems—whether social norms, machines, or AI—are not all-encompassing. Instead, human fallibility opens up a space for novelty, improvisation, and reinterpretation.

Comedy, then, becomes an existential act: the Schlemiel reminds us that life’s trajectory isn’t locked. The viewer, sharing in that unexpected twist, gains a phenomenological insight: freedom lies in the fact that, at any moment, life can be otherwise—and it’s precisely in that “otherwise” that agency—and laughter—arise.

The Schlemiel, Cultural Intervention, and the Unpredictable

The Schlemiel, and the laughter he/she evokes, is crucial. In a society driven by efficiency, optimization, and systems—be it technology, bureaucracy, or social norms—there’s a risk of becoming rigid, unreflective, and deterministic. The Schlemiel’s comic misstep ruptures that rigidity. It reminds us that beneath systems lies the unpredictable: the human.

Without that reflection on the “otherwise”—the possibility that things could be different—we risk a kind of cultural stasis. The Schlemiel, in falling out of sync, opens up the space for creativity, questioning, and even societal change. Thus, the Schlemiel—and our laughter—is not trivial. It’s a cultural corrective, reminding us that there’s always another way—and that freedom, and even ethical responsibility, lies in seeing those possibilities.

The ethical dimension arises because the Schlemiel’s disruption forces us to reconsider the rigid structures we take for granted—be they technological, social, or moral.

The Schlemiel’s “failure” reveals that human life isn’t reducible to rules or optimization. Ethically, recognizing these gaps—moments where the Schlemiel shows us that systems can be questioned—gives us a responsibility to rethink how we treat others, how we design systems, and how we allow for human complexity. The Schlemiel reminds us that without seeing these possibilities—without laughing at the rigidity—we risk becoming ethically complacent. Thus, the Schlemiel’s existence prompts us to remain open, adaptable, and attuned to the ethical demand to question—and humanize—the systems we live in.

The Schlemiel, through their clumsy misalignment with what’s “supposed to happen,” provokes laughter that’s more than amusement—it’s a moment of rupture. When we laugh, we’re acknowledging the rigidity of our norms, and that laugh momentarily frees us from them. The Schlemiel elicits this act of recognition: things don’t have to be as rigid as we’ve assumed. In that sense, the Schlemiel’s “failure” is an invitation: our laughter signals that we recognize the cracks in the system. From there, we can rethink and reshape—an ethical and cultural act in itself.

Consider Chaplin’s “The Great Dictator.” On the surface, it’s comedy—Chaplin’s Schlemiel-like character fumbles in a parody of authoritarianism. But that laughter unmasked the rigid, dangerous logic of fascism at a crucial historical moment. The film’s laughter wasn’t trivial—it ruptured the aura of inevitability around tyrannical power, allowing viewers to imagine otherwise. More broadly, films like “Dr. Strangelove” satirized Cold War rationality, exposing absurd gaps in nuclear logic. In each case, the Schlemiel figure—through laughter—invites society to confront its rigidities, creating a cultural moment where reflection—and action—become possible.

Chaplin’s “Modern Times” or “The Great Dictator” didn’t just entertain—they showed audiences the absurdity of being reduced to cogs in a machine or of unchecked authoritarianism. The laughter they evoked was a cultural reset, nudging society to see that things could be otherwise. Similarly, the Three Stooges’ chaotic slapstick subverted authority and structure, highlighting that everyday life wasn’t so rigid after all. These works, by puncturing cultural rigidity, helped shift collective imagination toward possibility—toward questioning, adapting, and envisioning a more open future.

In 2026, we find ourselves once again at a moment where the Schlemiel’s legacy offers us a cultural intervention. Just as Chaplin exposed the dehumanizing machinery of industrialization, and the Stooges mocked authority with chaos, today’s Schlemiel confronts an era of algorithms, automation, and AI determinism. The unpredictable misstep reminds us that, beyond these systems, human freedom and ethical possibility persist. Just as past comedies helped society reflect and adapt, we now have the same responsibility: to laugh at our rigidities, to see the gaps in our systems, and to create a future where human agency—in all its unpredictable, Schlemiel-like richness—remains at the center of what is possible.

Think about Woody Allen, the modern Schlemiel par excellence—neurotic, fumbling through New York, always tripping over relationships, existential questions, and even lobsters. He’s the guy who shows us that life is messy and that’s okay. Just like Chaplin’s Tramp or the Stooges with their wrenches, Allen’s self-deprecating humor reminds us that we don’t need to have it all together. So, whether we’re dodging AI or just trying to get through another awkward dinner date, the Schlemiel’s still here to say, “Relax! Laugh a little—you’ll see life isn’t as rigid as you think!”

Mistakes happen, life is unpredictable. The schlemiel is always in wonder about how unpredictable it is. If he only saw that banana…

On the Hasidic and Kabbalistic Meaning of Laughter – by Joseph Rosenfeld

I want to apologize to all of my subscribers for being off the blog for such a long time. I was literally locked out of my account because my password recovery email changed. After some time and back and forth with WordPress, everything worked out. Here I am! Hi’neni!

For my first post in a year and change, I’d like to share a reflection on laughter by Joseph Rosenfeld a friend of mine who is a master of Hasidic, Midrashic, and Kabblalistic texts. He also happens to be a fan of Schlemiel Theory! His reflection on laughter – something near and dear to this blog and blogger – shows how deep and important laughter is to Judaism, spiritually and intellectually.

We all know that Hasidim love to dance, sing, and tell stories. Joy, as the Baal Shem Tov (Father of the Hasidic movement), breaks all boundaries. It makes it possible for God’s light to break through into darkness. What is the deeper meaning of humor? Why is laughter so key to understanding Judaism?

Take a look:

Joseph Rosenfeld: “The Root of the Dispute Between Rebbe Nachman and the Shpoler Zeide and the Secret of Laughter”

The root of the dispute lies in the sublime laughter referenced in the verse “she laughs at the last day” (Proverbs 31:25), which is revealed precisely through the reversal associated with Binah (understanding).

The essential secret of the dispute between the Zeide and Rebbe Nachman, of blessed memory, is alluded to in Rebbe Nachman’s terse words regarding opposition, where he said that in the future it will be “a fine laughter.” That is, the entire matter of opposition and the darkness it brought about will all be transformed into the secret of future laughter. This follows the teaching of the Rebbe shlit”a, that this laughter is the laughter of the Leviathan, which arises from the cosmic battle between the Leviathan and the Wild Ox (Shor HaBar). Just as the ox represents revealed tzaddikim (righteous individuals) associated with Chokhmah (wisdom), the Leviathan symbolizes hidden tzaddikim rooted in Binah.

All opposition between tzaddikim is, in truth, rooted in the mystical opposition between Chokhmah and Binah, which is essentially the tension between ayin (nothingness) and yesh (being). Chokhmah points to the ayin of Atzilut (the highest world), while Binah relates to the “I” of Beriah, Yetzirah, and Asiyah (the lower worlds).

These two revelations are, by nature, diametrically opposed—like day and night, the sun and the moon, the “two great lights.” Therefore, they argue over the path by which two opposites can be united. The only way is through bitishah (collision), which is the secret of unity and peace within the dispute itself, in the aspect of “He makes peace in His heights”—which is an acronym for eisev (grass), as explained in Likutey Moharan I:39. This relates to the unification between Chokhmah, represented by the Divine Name AB (72), and Binah, associated with the Divine Name Elokim in its full spelling with yuds, which equals 300, alluding to the acronym AS”V.

Through dispute and collision, this wondrous unification is revealed—the secret of “a help opposite him.” For it is known that laughter emerges from gevurot (judgments) sweetened at their root, through Binah, where the secret of reversal is held, as in “v’nahafoch hu” (“and it was turned around”), with “hu” hinting to Binah.

Laughter is the ability to flip the path from what was expected to what was never imagined. As the sages say: “On the contrary, the opposite seems more correct” (adraba, ipcha mistabra)—an expression rooted in Binah, the mother. What we thought with our external intellect would lead to a known outcome is suddenly reversed. This astonishing movement of reversal is the inner sense of the joining of opposites, achieved specifically through reversal—or, as R. Aharon HaLevi of blessed memory put it, “unity from opposites.”

Laughter does not arise merely from change, but from the profound realization that what I had taken as obvious and certain was, in truth, only possible and doubtful. When a person realizes that what he assumed he had grasped remains merely hypothetical, a deep existential question emerges regarding how we perceive and interpret reality. When one sees that his previous understanding was merely a “hava amina” (preliminary assumption), his heart opens to see that he truly knows nothing. “I said I would acquire wisdom, but it is far from me.”

At the moment this awareness arises—that all prior knowledge was only a possibility—every calculation of knowledge collapses, and one enters a higher plane: the world of emunah (faith). Normally, a person navigates the world—this night-like realm—using wisdom and understanding: the mind and heart. But when these fail through sudden revelation (“my father and mother have forsaken me”), he must sink deeper into the soul’s core, the realm of Keter (crown), which transcends both Chokhmah and Binah, as in “but the Lord gathers me in.” Where Chokhmah and Binah end, there begins the power of wonder—Keter, the seat of emunah.

Only through emunah can a person withstand contradictions that defy reason. Emunah gives the capacity to hold two opposites in one subject, and through this, laughter is revealed—rooted in the union of opposites, as in “I saw an upside-down world.” This world of reversal is the realm of emunah, where the saying “on the contrary, the opposite seems correct” comes to life: the ability to discard outdated intellect and receive new insight from a higher place—the lights of Keter, the root of laughter.

The secret of laughter is the revelation of Binah as it is rooted in Keter, in the innermost dimension of Binah, which is the inner dimension of Atik, known as Radla (Reisha d’lo Ityada – the Unknowable Head).

The essence is that the root of laughter is found in Keter, as in “your God shall rejoice over you” (yasis, same gematria as Keter). There, the entirety of lower existence is rooted in the supreme yesh (being), in the necessity of existence—the true yesh—which exists only in Keter. Only Keter can hold opposites within one reality. It rules over the paradox of “above and below simultaneously,” like Moses’s unknown grave—appearing above to the lower and below to the higher—these are the consciousness of the “world of reversal.”

As long as the lights of Keter shine in the world, there is a revelation of the Infinite Light (Or Ein Sof)—for schok (laughter) equals “Infinite Light” in gematria. This is the new vitality descending from the heights into the world to sustain existence. Prior to laughter, there was a form of death—a breakdown of mind and heart—“my father and mother abandoned me.” Precisely there, in the death of intellect, is where the new revelation must emerge—from the heights of Radla. Since this revelation arises precisely from the death of intellect and heart, the new consciousness must carry within it the power to unify opposites, for the very cause of the breakdown was the encounter with paradox.

The revelation of a gap between the old and new understanding evokes a crisis of contradiction. This cannot be resolved with ordinary intellect—it has shattered. A light higher than mind and heart is required: the light of Keter, which includes both the “I” of perception and the “nothingness” of its negation. From there a new power arises—Keter, the wonder-working unifier of opposites. The core of the breakdown lies in their opposition, and the repair lies in their union—an astonishing unity at the heart of Keter’s joy: “He shall rejoice over you.”

Thus, Radla is the power of containing opposites, and through it laughter is revealed—a new understanding that what I thought I knew, I truly did not. As it says, “no one knows his burial place.” Laughter is the descent of Keter into the opposition between what was known and now unknown—this is the path to unite Chokhmah and Binah. True laughter does not unify by merging parts into something new through mutual cancellation. That method still cannot tolerate opposites.

Laughter, by contrast, allows both to exist simultaneously, even without fusing them. Its root reveals the wondrous power of linking through separation—each stands fully intact, and still, they connect. “Mem and Samech stood miraculously” (Talmud, Shabbat 104a). Their coexistence amid contradiction is inexplicable, yet functional.

This unification is not a frontal embrace (panim el panim), but a back-to-back (achor b’achor) union—each maintaining its identity, without surrendering to the other. Still, they are joined, through distance itself, in the high realm of Atik, where masculine and feminine are connected achor b’achor, like a floating tower in air, with no ground. Here, the only path to unity is through laughter, which breaks old frameworks and invites emunah into a world of new combinations beyond prior logic.

Only by breaking the strong vessels of old intellect can one enter the world of laughter, “a fine laughter, refined to the finest degree.” Through this breaking, one enters the gates of joy, where even contradiction becomes unity.

Thus, the “fine laughter” that will arise in the future from the dispute between the Zeide and Rebbe Nachman is not only a description of what will be, but reflects the very nature of the dispute—itself a form of redemptive laughter. It arises from a union forged through bitishah (crushing), an acronym for bitachon, tov, schok—trust, goodness, and laughter. This unity is possible only in the hidden realm of Radla, where the light of paradox reigns and unites opposites within contradiction itself.

Chokhmah and Binah are truly inseparable companions (trein re’in d’lo mitparshin), and thus both are needed, in the secret of “I and nothingness simultaneously,” revealed through Radla, in the unity-through-crushing (bitishah)—a mystery of “reaching and not reaching” that will be explained further, God willing.

Ultimately, the laughter that will arise from this dispute is an extended revelation of the true laughter that flows from the innermost depths of Keter—Radla. It is the path to perfect repair, revealing how both Chokhmah (ayin) and Binah (ani) work together to disclose the sublime light of Radla, the da’at (knowing) of peace.”

Reflections on the Passing of Milan Kundera & The Magical Ring of Political Delusions: “Marching Like Fascists, Dancing Like Children”

I grew up in a small town in the Adirondacks. We lived on a few acres of land. We had a pond, a stream, and a marsh in back of our house. In back of my house, I could see the mountains. Since we lived in a valley, I would see the weather come in from the mountains, slowly passing over my house. I lived in a kind of slow solitude, outside of history. To be sure, many Americans growing up in the 80s and 90s lived in a space outside history. But some theorists see this as a result of the burgeoning of mass media and capitalism. Entertainment keeps historical rupture at arms length.

Fredric Jameson – the celebrated theorist of postmodernism – saw America as post-historical, epitomized by artists such as Andy Warhol, whose art was focused much more on pop culture, pastiche, and irony. While we know him for his colorful variations of celebrities, soup cans, and cleaning supplies, he also depicted accidents, electric chairs, and tragic sensationalism.

Warhol could only hint about this. He was more interested in how we were distracted by celebrity, glamour, and American products. History was not his concern. Pop art demonstrates a kind of historical amnesia. Today, with Tik Tok, Instagram, etc we see how far distraction can go to displace history. For the majority of the world, there is no deep thought about historical things. There are memes. Happiness may or may not come out of one’s daily death scrolling.

In contrast to all this, Milan Kundera lived and breathed history and experienced the horrors of communism. He was a Czech-born French novelist and went into exile in France in 1975, acquiring citizenship in 1981. His books were censored by the Communists in Czechoslovakia

His literature opened my eyes – as an American – to things I never thought about. What is the relationship of literature to history? What is the meaning and purpose of comedy? How can history, war, and politics ruin lives and thwart growth and flourishing as a human being?

To be sure, Americans don’t have the same legacy as Europeans do for literature. We have – in many ways – inherited it from them. What Kundera did is noteworthy in this sense. In his amazing book, the Art of the Novel, he provides a powerful genealogy of the modern novel, staring with Don Quixote.

In The Art of the Novel, Milan Kundera argues that comedy changed everything.  According to Kundera, comedy announces the death of tradition, certainty, and religion.   But, at the same time, it announces a new tradition which is born in the wake of death.  For Kundera, the origin of this new tradition, which bears witness to the death of the old tradition, has a proper name.

Kundera names the herald of death and the father of a new tradition: Don Quixote.

As I note elsewhere, Kundera’s read on literature is apocalyptic.

The new message is Apocalyptic and Kundera is describing it for us. The herald of this message is Kafka.  Now the land Surveyor lives in a world which is not simply ambiguous; it is dangerous.  The world may kill this comic character! It deprives the fool of his freedom.  Perhaps Kafka’s Land Surveyor (from The Castle) marks the death of a legacy?

After Kafka, Kundera wonders: is the novel dead?

But if Cervantes is the founder of the Modern Era, then the end of his legacy ought to signify more than a mere stage in the history of literary forms; it would herald the end of the Modern Era.  That is why the blissful smile that accompanies those obituaries of the novel strike me is frivolous.  Frivolous because I have already seen and lived through the death of the novel, a violent death (inflicted by bans, censorship, and ideological pressure) in the world where I spent much of my life and which is usually called totalitarian.

In effect, Kundera is telling us, by virtue of his own personal witness, that the novel was killed by the Totalitarian world.  This world, in contrast to the novel, lives in accordance with “one single Truth.”

But this is not enough of a death sentence. Kundera says that the novel is a “cemetery of missed opportunities.”  They include four appeals: to play, to the dream, to thought, and to time.

Kundera notes authors for each appeal.  They include, respectively, Laurence Sterne and Denis Diderot (appeal to play); Franz Kafka and the Surrealists (appeal to dream); Musil and Broch (the appeal to thought); and Proust (the appeal to time).

In an Apocalyptic tone, he notes that they all belong to a “cemetery of missed opportunities.”  Milan Kundera has personally witnessed their death.  He has witnessed the political death of the novel and the death of all of these appeals.  However, at this moment of description, in the face of this death, Kundera pronounces a new life for the novel. He pronounces a new purpose in the post-totalitarian era.

In a world in which everything is caught up in a “veritable whirlpool of reduction” the novel’s raison d’etre is to “keep the ‘world of life’ under a permanent light and to protect us from the ‘forgetting of being.’”

The brilliance of Kundera’s work, especially in his novel, The Book of Laughter and Forgetting, is to challenge a kind of comedy that emerges out of politics; a kind of laughter, that creates a forgetfulness of history, of being, and weight.

In this novel, he takes aim at the “magical ring” of activism.

“A magazine photograph: a row of men in uniforms, bearing rifles and in helmets with protective plastic visors, watch a group of young people in jeans and T-shirts, hand in hand in a ring, dance in front of them…..I think I understand them: they have the impression that the circle they are describing on the ground is a magical circle uniting them like a ring. And their chests swell with an intense feeling of innocence: they are united not by marching, like soldiers or fascists formations, but by dancing, like children. What they are trying to spit in the cops’ faces is their innocence.

That is how the photographer saw them, and he brought out an eloquent contrast: on one side, the police and the false unity (imposed, commanded) of the row, on the other, the young people in the true unity (sincere and natural) of the circle; on this side the police in the sullen posture of lying in wait, and on the that one, those who are delighting in play.

Dancing in a ring is magic; a ring dance speaks to us from the ancient depths of our memories”( 88-89)

Kundera goes on to describe the laughter that comes out of people who revel in this kind of circle which puts sensuality and childish innocence into a mystical plane. He sees this by way of a teacher who indoctrinates her students into her mystical ring:

“Madame Raphael, the teacher” who “clipped that photo from the magazine and gazed at it dreamily. She too wished to dance in a ring. All her life she looked for a circle of men and women with whom she could hold hands and ring dance, at first in the Methodist Church (her father was a religious fanatic), then in the Communist Party, then in the Trotskyist Party, then in a Trotskyist splinter party….then she looked for it in Marxists, in psychoanalysts, in structuralists, looked for it in Lenin, in Zen Buddhism, in Mao Tse-Tung…she wishes at least to be in perfect harmony with her students, to be at one with them, meaning that she always compels them to thing and say the same things she does, to merge with her into a single body and a sing soul in the same circle and the same dance”(89)

Recalling a moment when two of her students – Gabrielle and Michelle – were “bent over an Ionesco play,” the narrator points out their passionate reading of this absurdist play. While reading they come across a passage about a cat who has “six paws.” They struggle with its meaning. But then Michelle has an aha moment: “This dialogue is certainly intended to create a comic effect”(90).

At this moment, they have a kind of mystical revelation about comedy that, as the narrator shows, is deluded and actually contrary to what Ionesco was trying to get across:

“The two girls look into each other’s eyes, their lips quiver with something like pride, and finally their mouths let out some short, spasmodic sounds in the higher reaches of their vocal range. Then the same sounds again and again. “A forced laugh. A laughable laugh. A laugh so laughable they can do nothing but laugh. Then comes real laughter. Bursts of repeated, rushing, unbridled laughter…They laugh their laughter until the infinity of their laughter…O laughter! Laughter of sensual pleasure, sensual pleasure of laughter”(90)

At this moment, the narrator evokes the “nearby people…holding hands and dancing in a ring”(91) yet for some reason, there is a void in the middle of this circle. “Madame Raphael, oddly anguished and unsatisfied, made her way home…”(91).

Following this, the narrator recalls his own memory of dancing in a ring: “I too once danced in a ring. It was in 1948. In my country, the Communists had taken power…and I took other Communist students by the hands or shoulders and we took two steps in place, one step forward, raised the left leg to one side, then the right to the other, and we did this nearly every month, because we always had something to celebrate…old injustices were redressed, new injustices were perpetrated, factories were nationalized, thousands of people went to prison…Then one day I said something I should not have said, was expelled from the party, and had to leave the ring dance. Then I understood the magical meaning of the circle”(92).

What did Kundera teach us? He taught us how when we are high on ourselves and our fantasies – when we are floating away in the dance, laughing – history will remind us about the meaning of the circle. Modernist literature – I learned from Kundera – is a balance between laughter and the weight of being.

Some laugh to remember, some laugh to forget. This reminds me of the Samuel Beckett line – often noted by Theodor Adorno – that is the subtitle of this blog: “the laugh that laughs at the laugh.”

That is the kind of laughter we hear in these passages. It is a heavy kind of laughter that has learned from history. Today, we need to take this to heart. But we are only capable of this laughter if we learn how to read again. In our age of TikTok and rapid-fire social media, we may all get caught up in the mystical ring of this or that movement only to wake up and realize that we’ve been duped.

Rest in peace, Milan Kundera.

Al Jaffee of Mad Magazine Passes at 102 (A Note on his work, Jewishness, and the Schlemiel Character)

Al Jaffee – who was at the inception of Mad Magazine in 1952, and returned in 1964 and stayed until it folded in 2019 – died today, at the age of 102.

Known primarily for his “fold-in” for Mad Magazine, in his last interview, for New York Magazine’s Culture blog, Vulture, he talks about his Jewish roots in Lithuania, and much else. Apparently, he was raised in an observant home and, like many Jews he took to humor. He saw all things oddly, including his own Jewishness:

But you weren’t born in Lithuania?
No, I was born in Savannah, Georgia, in 1921. But both of my parents were from Lithuania. My mother was very religious, and she wanted to go back to a place where she felt comfortable. She moved back, and brought me and my three brothers with her. This was in 1927.

How did those six years in Lithuania affect your comic sensibility?
My father remained in America through those six years, and I made him promise to send me American comic strips. Every few months or so, my brothers and I would receive a package of rolled-up Sunday color comics and daily comics. We would just sit there and read them for days and days. My brother Harry, who was also artistic, would take these Sunday comic pages, and we’d cut them up and turn them into little books. We would provide our own dialogue, maybe with a Lithuanian joke or two
.

Most of the comics we received were humorous. Some were adventurous, in the “Little Orphan Annie” mold. There was no TV or radio, so that was pretty much it for us. But I would see humor in everything, even in the religious practices, which didn’t quite register with me.

I found religion sort of funny. There was something that just didn’t make sense about not being able to play ball or not being able to walk too far on the Sabbath. These very strict religious prohibitions against any kind of enjoyment just struck me as being very old-fashioned and strange. Maybe I was bringing my Savannah influence with me; I don’t know. I was sort of straddling these two cultures: the New World and the Old World.

He also discusses humor in relation to anti-Semitism and saw it – like Charlie Chaplin and others – as ridiculous:

It is also really telling that one of his first ideas to come into the comic scene was to do a parody of Superman. It is fascinating because, as Hannah Arendt argues in her seminal essay on the schlemiel, “The Jew as Pariah,” that Charlie Chaplin had failed to laugh Hitler out of office with his film, The Great Dictator (1940); and for that reason, the schlemiel, as an American icon (as found in Chaplin) was displaced, according to Arendt, by Superman.

Jaffee parodied that displacement:

What was your first comic-book sale? How old were you?


I was 20. I went to see Will Eisner, who was the creator of a comic strip called “The Spirit,” which was beautifully drawn and very creative. The opening splash pages were all so brilliantly conceived. In the comics field, we all admired this strip tremendously. Will was a genius. He just did beautiful work.

I had created a parody of Superman called “Inferior Man,” and I wanted to show it to Will. It seems so naïve now, but it seemed like the right thing to do at the time.

Was this the first parody of Superman? This would have been what, the early ’40s? Superman had only been around a few years at that point.


At that time, there was another character who was called Stuporman — it was published by DC Comics. I don’t know if mine was the first Superman takeoff, but it really doesn’t matter. I came up with mine independently. Since then, I’ve seen a million takeoffs, but, at that time, there weren’t many. When I brought this idea to Will, I had no idea whether I was doing something stupid or not. But Will, who was only a few years older than I was, was already very successful. He hired me on the spot to do “Inferior Man” as a filler for his comic books.

Several years later, Jaffee was asked to create a character for the Chabad Lubavitch’s kids magazine under Tzivos Hashem. He took the task.

In its colorful pages, Al Jaffee reinvented a character called “the Shpy.” Part-fumbling secret agent and part-Torah scholar, “the Shpy,” clad in a trench coat with his hat pulled over his eyes and an attaché case filled with every conceivable gadget, is tasked with doing battle against the Yetzer Hora, the evil inclination.

This character has – without a doubt – some schlemiel characteristics in the way he is playfully portrayed. The Lubavitcher Rebbe commented to Rabbi Pape – whose magazine this character appeared in – about Jaffe’s caricatures:

“We used to send the cover of every issue to the Rebbe,” recalls Pape. “He would look it over and make suggestions—such as making sure girls were represented on every cover.” Other comments from the Rebbe included his belief that caricatures should be avoided in the magazine. In a note to the editors, the Rebbe wrote, “It’s not fitting that people should be drawn with unnaturally oversized bodies and cartoonishly large noses, even though that style is common in comics.” To do so, the Rebbe noted, was a “huge educational mistake.”

“When it came to the cartoonish elements that the Rebbe wanted us to avoid,” says Pape, “I don’t think he wanted children to laugh at how others looked. He was sensitive to those with various defining traits or disabilities and wanted art to reflect that sensitivity.”

Whether it is Inferior Man, Stuporman or Shpy, Jaffe wanted to create a parody of the superhero that was in line with the schlemiel character and its comical adventures in the world. To be sure, the schlemiel character is a Jewish response to the hero. The schlemiel is self-deprecating and, as Ruth Wisse puts it, wins an “ironic victory.”

He may not be superman, but he has the sincerity of Gimpel or Rabbi Nachaman’s humble simpleton who, like many a Jew, finds humor everywhere. Comedy is more in tune with Judaism than tragedy. After all, the Jewish tradition teaches us that the best ending is a divine comedy (albeit, not in Dante’s sense).

The schlemiel stayed with Jaffee, so to speak, throughout his career and marks his mission in life to make people laugh at the powerful and take joy in the power of comedy. In defiance of Arendt’s Superman prediction, the schlemiel lived on in his work.

May his memory be for a blessing!

Adorno on Persecution Mania, Antisemitism, and Anne Frank

With the rise of anti-semitism in America – which I have experienced, personally; and see on social media, perpetually – I have been starting to think more about what it is and what we can do to – if possible – counter-act it. One era that I have studied in depth and written on in many essays and book chapters, is the period before, during, and after the Holocaust. German Jewish thinkers like Walter Benjamin, Hannah Arendt, Gershom Scholem, and Theodor Adorno have been on my radar for some time.

Today, I look to what Adorno’s thoughts were after anti-semitism had its run through Germany, destroyed the country, and annihilated millions of Jews. How did it germinate, so to speak, in Germany? One thought that came to me is that what we are seeing right now with paranoia on social media about this or that group and its power is a symptom of anti-semitism. Adorno, in an essay entitled, “The Meaning of Working Through the Past,” sees the forces around nationalism as “intentionally self-deluded.” For him, nationalism is the “heritage of barbarically primitive tribal attitudes” that was against anything different. As the nation decayed, so to speak, it became, according to Adorno, “sadistic and destructive.”

Nationalism does not completely believe in itself anymore, and yet it is a political necessity because it is the most effective means of motivating people to insist on conditions that are, viewed objectively, obsolete. This is why, as something ill at ease with itself, intentionally self-deluded, it has taken on grotesque features nowadays. Admittedly nationalism, the heritage of barbarically primitive tribal attitudes, never lacked such traits altogether, but they were reined in as long as liberalism guaranteed the right of the individual—also concretely as the condition of collective prosperity. Only in an age in which it was already toppling has nationalism become completely sadistic and destructive.

For Adorno, the energy behind nationalism (“nationalism as a paranoid delusion system”) was “paranoia,” which, for the Nazis, was a “persecution mania.” It was “contagious.”

We see something like this today, on social media with anti-semitism in which anti-semites – like Kanye or his white supremecist muse, Nick Fuentes -have the paranoid belief that Jews control everything and are destroying not just the nation but they, themselves, personally.

The rage of Hitler’s world against everything that was different—nationalism as a paranoid delusional system—was already of this caliber. The appeal of precisely these features is hardly any less today. Paranoia, the persecution mania that persecutes those upon whom it projects what it itself desires, is contagious. Collective delusions, like anti-Semitism, confirm the pathology of the individual, who shows that psychologically he is no longer a match for the world and is thrown back upon an illusory inner realm. 

This fascinating part is that the anti-semite is “no longer a match for the world” and, in his retreat to his or her keyboard, is “thrown back upon an illusory inner realm.” In other words, the anti-semite, in taking the world as the enemy of the average American, etc cannot live in this world where it used to dwell so it he/she is thrown back into their private illusory worlds that are supported by other people tweeting, instagraming, etc from their lonely keyboards.

Anti-Semitism is so difficult to refute because the psychic economy of innumerable people needed it and, in an attenuated form, presumably still needs it today. Whatever happens by way of propaganda remains ambiguous.

Anti-semitism, in other words, is a “collective” desire. It is a desire based on paranoia that, because it is needed – due to alienation, loneliness, and confusion – is urgent and pressing. After arriving at this thought, Adorno turns to someone who enjoyed the dramatization of The Diary of Anne Frank. What, one may ask, is the connection of this dramatic experience to anti-semitism or persecution mania?

I was told the story of a woman who, upset after seeing a dramatization of The Diary of Anne Frank, said: “Yes, but that girl at least should have been allowed to live.” To be sure even that was good as a first step toward understanding. But the individual case, which should stand for, and raise awareness about, the terrifying totality, by its very individuation became an alibi for the totality the woman forgot. The perplexing thing about such observations remains that even on their account one cannot advise against productions of the Anne Frank play and the like, because their effect nonetheless feeds into the potential for improvement, however repugnant they also are and however much they seem to be a profanation of the dignity of the dead.

This person, for Adorno, only sees the individual, Anne Frank, she doesn’t see the “terrifying totality,” that made Anne Frank into an animal to be hunted and killed by Nazis. But, notes Adorno, the effect of this play can still “feed the potential for improvement.” While a play like the Diary of Anne Frank, seems to be a “profanation of the dignity of the dead” (something Eli Weisel or Paul Celan might say), it still can bring someone to a potentiality for “improvement.”

But Adorno has his doubts because he does not think the “genuine” anti-semite’s experience of real Jews – not fictional or dramatized ones – can efface his or her anti-semitism. Why? Because this presupposes that an anti-semite has the capacity for experience. On the contrary, writes Adorno, “the genuine anti-Semite is defined far more by his incapacity for any experience whatsoever, by his unresponsiveness.”

All too often the presupposition is that anti-Semitism in some essential way involves the Jews and could be countered through concrete experiences with Jews, whereas the genuine anti-Semite is defined far more by his incapacity for any experience whatsoever, by his unresponsiveness. If anti-Semitism primarily has its foundation in objective society, and only derivatively in anti-Semites, then—as the National Socialist joke has it—if the Jews had not already existed, the anti-Semites would have had to invent them.

For Adorno, the anti-Semite can’t experience the other; s/he cannot be changed. In a Levinasian sense, he cannot be vulnerable to the other and is incapable of experience because he has negated the world and put a paranoid one in its place. Even if s/he meets a real Jew – Kanye met many – this doesn’t change a thing. The anti-Semite is not in the world; he or she is in his or her own world; in that paranoid reality, the Jew is controlling everything. Only by destroying the Jew, taking away Jewish power, will the anti-Semite feel and know that the world he or she has projected on his or her – see below – (paranoid) world.

Why Wasn’t Chaim Topol of “Fiddler on the Roof” Mentioned in Last Night’s Oscars?

One of the most notable losses to the film world of recent note was the death of Chaim Topol (four days ago). To be sure, Topol received two Golden Globe Awards and was a nominee for both a Tony Award and an Academy Award. He won the most prestigious award in Israel, the Israel Prize, for his performance in Fiddler on the Roof. The play has run 3500 times on the Broadway Stage. Fiddler held the record for the longest-running Broadway musical for almost 10 years until Grease surpassed its run…and yet, there was no mention whatsoever of his death.

With this in mind, a Jewish Telegraph Article (JTA) with the title, “‘Fabelmans’ flops at the Oscars, but Hollywood’s Jewish History Gets a Nod,” caught my eye. The choice of wording is apropos. Jewish films or actors, in seems, are no longer celebrated in Hollywood. They get a “nod” (although Topol didn’t even get that).

The broadcast included a promotional video for the Academy Museum, which opened last year to celebrate the history of Hollywood. In the video, a curator named Dara Jaffe explains that one of the museum’s roles is to “bring important film histories to light, from the Jewish immigrants who founded the Hollywood studios to the early innovators of African-American cinema.” The inclusion is notable because the museum drew steep criticism when it first opened for giving short shrift to the industry’s robust Jewish history; Jaffe was appointed to put together a permanent exhibition about that history in response. The exhibition has not yet opened.

For now on, Jewish history and Jews in Hollywood will only get “nods,” especially the best of them. Just like at the museum in Los Angeles honoring the film industry, where the Jews who founded Hollywood are barely mentioned. David Chappelle and Louis Farakahn think Jews have too much power in Hollywood, so, it’s time to start “nodding” rather than celebrating. That is about all Jews in Hollywood and their history will get. That seems to be the new trajectory.

From recent movies like You People by Jonah Hill, we learn that Jews have too much power and privilege and are no different from spoiled white people with inhereted wealth (more than one generation of wealth, today, is considered a sin by the contemporary race theory ideologues, like Ibram X Kendi).

In this new context, Jews are “white” and don’t deserve anything close to celebration, especially one of America’s top Jewish filmmakers, Steven Spielberg. As the English comedian David Baddiel puts it, today, Jews don’t count. The celebration of Jewish success has been sidelined by the new regime of diversity, equity, and inclusion. The culture industry has moved on to the next “thing.”

An article by Tablet that brought out what this means – in terms of fresh data – is eye opening. It is entitled, “The Vanishing.”

I’ll end with a brief quote from the article which sums up the situation and may help us to understand why Topol wasn’t a focus – since, after all, such a choice may have put too much focus on the Jews and their contributions to American film and theater.

As true believers in the postwar liberal project, American Jews spent decades advocating for tolerance and equality of opportunity, not least because we were the prime beneficiaries. The ADL didn’t fight the quotas in the 1950s so Jews could matriculate in proportion to their percentage of the population. But there’s a tension between meritocracy and representation. The new DEI regime treats any disparity between groups as evidence of unfair advantage—and yet we’re supposed to think it’s a coincidence that Jewish representation plummets at the exact moment America frantically pushes to racially rebalance all high-status industries.

Because what is framed as a backlash against America’s “white” centers of power is in many cases a clever sleight of hand. Jews are being disproportionately purged from liberal institutions because Jews disproportionately exist within those institutions.

When activists and journalists and executives talk about how Broadway or NPR or publishing is “too white,” what they really mean is “too Jewish.” When The New York Times says it wants to make its internal demographics look more like New York City’s (excepting the Hasidim, of course), what this means is “fewer Jews.” Twenty years ago, if Pat Robertson spoke along these lines—making the same complaints about the same people and industries and institutions—there would have been a rush to condemn it as antisemitic. Today it passes for social justice.

In the 1960s and ’70s, facing hard barriers to their professional advancement, Soviet Jews lost the faith. The children and the grandchildren of the revolution tried to emigrate. When the authorities wouldn’t let them, American Jews rallied to their cause, created brand-new communal organizations, petitioned Congress, rallied thousands-strong outside the United Nations. Ours was a community confident in its power and confident in its future.

Asian Americans have the dignity of looking at admissions practices and demanding fair representation. The Jews, as ever, are a people apart. From civil rights to Vietnam to the spectacular bounty of their cultural and political achievements, liberal Jewish boomers always managed to be on the right side of history. It is a supreme irony that they’ve helped empower a movement that now places their children and grandchildren on the wrong side.

If Putin or Orban reduced their universities’ Jewish populations by 50%, the ADL would be howling. But Harvard and Yale can magically lose nearly half their Jewish students in less than a decade and we’ll take it on the chin. That this is occurring with the full acquiescence of a terrified liberal Jewish establishment should tell you just how much power Jews in America still have.

Chaim Topol – Who Played Tevye Fiddler on the Roof – Passes Away

I was born and raised in a small town in the Adirondacks called Mayfield. In elementary school, I was the only Jew in my class. When we sang in the school assembly in December, we sang several Christmas carols; but to make sure I didn’t feel like the odd one out, the teachers included two songs about Hannukah. All the students would look at me and smile as we sang. After an anti-semitic incident in junior high, I transferred to a nearby school, in Gloversville, New York where I went to Hebrew school and was bar-mitzvahed (in that school, I was one of three Jews in my grade).

Why do I mention any of this in a reflection on Chaim Topol?

Both of my parents and most of my family are Jews from New York City. But besides Annie Hall (1977), Mad Magazine, and Hebrew School classes after school that I barely focused on (save for the units on the Holocaust), I had little exposure to Jewishness as a child. The movie, Fiddler on the Roof (1971), however, was one of the most Jewish things I ever saw. It was even staged at one of my schools. The songs, the dancing, the story all intrigued me and made me feel ok about being an American Jew. My non-Jewish videographer included parts of the soundtrack in my Bar Mitzvah Video (at the beginning and end). It seemed to have brought me into an appreciation of “tradition” and life.

Later in life, after I was an undergrad, I found out for myself what Judaism was all about by going to Yeshiva and taking on a more observant lifestyle. Be that as it may, it was this film that gave me my first vague sense of what Jewishness I came from…in old Europe. I always wondered what life was like there, before the Holocaust.

I was intrigued with the Tevye character played so wonderfully by Chaim Topol. He was so full of life, so reflective, honest, and self-deprecating. Since Woody Allen’s and Mel Brooks’ films, as well as Mad Magazine, were my pop cultural guides to Jewishness, I always wondered how Tevye measured up. Was he a schlemiel like most characters in these films or caricatures in Mad?

We need to look at the original inspiration for the Broadway / Hollywood character by turning to Shalom Aleichem, who wrote these stories in the wake of pogroms and before the Holocaust.

Ruth Wisse, in The Schlemiel as Modern Hero, doesn’t think so. She contrasts Tevye to the character Menahem Mendel and sees Tevye as the embodiment of a schlemiel (who lacks insight into his condition) and his opposite (who does). Tevye, unlike the schlemiel character, experiences “ironic resignation” while also having an “elemental life instinct”:

I.L. Trunk distinguishes between these two heroes: Menahem Mendl, he says, is pure instinct. Unlike Tevye the Dairyman, he does not experience ironic resignation, or ironic faith: he ‘expresses the elemental life instinct which does not see its tragic perspectives.” But taken together, Menahem Mendl and his wife Sheyne Sheyndl, do create the ironic juxtapositions that Tevye expresses in his own person, allowing the reader to weigh the fierce optimism against a tragic perspective. Together they represent two extremes of faith and failure. (56)

For Sander Pinsker, in his book The Schlemiel as Metaphor, Tevye is a character who “best captures the tragic-comic sprit of the Diaspora”(32) when he says, “With God’s help I starved to death – I and my wife and children – three times a day, not counting supper”(32). Pinsker says – playing on Nietzsche in the Birth of Tragedy – that Tevye gives “tragic affirmation a new twist.”

For Pinsker, like Wisse, Tevye is a figure of faith:

With the world of the shtetl all but disintegrated and ‘modern children’ threatening to abandon its traditions entirely, Tevye not only continues to pattern his life on the Old Ways, but he also has a perfect faith that the Old Ways will somehow prevail. (36)

But he is a schlimazel because history ruins his life and his family. He loves them all, but he is the last person to preserve faith in the midst of rapid change. Aleichem wrote these tales before the Holocaust. That Europe is gone. But the spirit of Tevye, so beautifully embodied and preserved for the ages by Chaim Topol is with us.

What I loved about Chaim Topol’s performance of faith was how he embodied it through his acting. His joy and his tribulations, embodied through his “tragic affirmation,” gave me hope. One can be bold and Jewish in America, I thought, but how? Through theater? Literature? Film? A religious life?

To be sure, the film and the play are a part of what Sidrah DeKoven Ezrahi, in her book, Booking Passage: Exile and Homecoming in the Jewish Imagination, of a general post-WWII construction of a “virtual shtetl” – as we see with the popularity of I.B. Singer’s fiction, Irving Howe’s World of our Fathers, his Yiddish Anthology, new translations of Yiddish writers, etc – which emerged after the European shtetl and its Jewish culture were obliterated by the Nazis. For her, it is a form of nostalgia since that world is gone for good.

Be that as it may, the film and play touched the hearts of millions of people, Jews and non-Jews. Topol gave it new meaning and purpose. It is a past that means a lot to us insofar as we imagine it to be on the threshold of a rich Yiddish culture and an ancient faith that was challenged by history, pogroms, anti-semitism, etc. The point is to remain strong in the face of it all and to make a “tragic affirmation” of faith when it seems to have run its course.

Rest in peace, Chaim. Baruch Dayin Ha’emes.

You changed the world and gave us an embodiment of Jewish life, faith, and culture that inspired many Jews, like myself, to look deeper into their Jewishness.